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Abstract—Malicious activities on measurements from
sensors like Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) can mis-
lead the control center operator into taking wrong control
actions resulting in disruption of operation, financial
losses, and equipment damage. In particular, false data
attacks initiated during power systems transients caused
due to abrupt changes in load and generation can fool
the conventional model-based detection methods relying
on thresholds comparison to trigger an anomaly. In this
paper, we propose a Koopman mode decomposition (KMD)
based algorithm to detect and identify false data attacks
in real-time. The Koopman modes (KMs) are capable
of capturing the nonlinear modes of oscillation in the
transient dynamics of the power networks and reveal the
spatial embedding of both natural and anomalous modes
of oscillations in the sensor measurements. The Koopman-
based spatio-temporal nonlinear modal analysis is used
to filter out the false data injected by an attacker. The
performance of the algorithm is illustrated on the IEEE 68-
bus test system using synthetic attack scenarios generated
on GridSTAGE, a recently developed multivariate spatio-
temporal data generation framework for simulation of
adversarial scenarios in cyber-physical power systems.
Index Terms—cyber-physical security; Koopman mode
decomposition; false data injection; online attack identifi-
cation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern electrical grids are increasingly complex
cyber-physical systems, with advanced sensing, control
and communication layers overlaid on nonlinear dy-
namical networks. Real-time grid operations are aided
by closed-loop feedback control decisions that rely on
advanced sensor measurements to dynamically secure the
balance between supply and demand. For instance, the
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is a multi-program
national laboratory operated by Battelle for the U.S. Department of
Energy (DOE) under contract No. DE-AC05-76RL01830.
automatic generation control (AGC), illustrated in Fig. 1,
is designed to process measurements from advanced
sensors such as phasor measurement units (PMUs) to
update the governor set-points of the generators every
few seconds. Such tightly coupled cyber-physical control
operation arguably presents an opportunity for malicious
cyber agents to sneak into the system and cause disrup-
tions, equipment damages and/or financial losses. Real-
world events such as the Stuxnet [1], the Dragonfly [2],
and the 2015 cyber-attacks on the Ukrainian power grid
[3] and on a substation in the state of California in
US [4], demonstrate the vulnerability of power systems
worldwide to cyber attacks. Different, possibly over-
lapping, classes of cyber-attacks have been investigated
in the power systems community, including denial of
service (DoS) attacks [5], [6]; gray-hole or packet drop
attacks [7]; jamming or link-failure attacks [5], [8]; and
false data injection (FDI) or data integrity attacks [5],
[6], [9]–[11].
Related Work Due to economic and other reasons,
sensors are arguably among the least-protected compo-
nents in a power network [12] and, therefore, particularly
vulnerable to malicious cyber attacks. As such, we focus
in this work on identification of FDI attacks on PMUs
which can report GPS time-stamped measurements at
typically 20-60 samples per second [7] and allows
visibility into the system transient dynamics. A broad
category of research efforts that considers power sys-
tems transient dynamics while detecting and identifying
sensor attacks relies on physics-based models, coupled
with a dynamic state estimator (e.g. Kalman filters),
to detect anomalous sensors data via outlier detection
methods such as cosine similarity test or statistical χ2-
test [13]–[15]. In [15], a state-space transformation and
decomposition technique was proposed to distinguish
between the anomalies caused due to malicious attacks
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Fig. 1. Illustration of a closed-loop power system, including the
controller (e.g. AGC), sensors (e.g. PMUs), actuators (e.g. generators)
and the communication layer (via WAN).
and physical changes (e.g. changes in topology, load,
generation). In [16], the authors extended the conven-
tional static outlier detection method of evaluating one
sample of measurements at a time to a dynamic change-
point detector based on the cumulative sum (CUSUM)
test on a moving window of measurements. The work in
[17] presents an attack detection algorithm that involves
superimposing watermarked signals on the control in-
puts transmitted over secure channels. In addition to
the physics-based methods mentioned above, machine
learning-based online attack detection algorithms have
been proposed in [18], [19].
Approach Most of the existing detection methods are
often unreliable during system transients due to unfore-
seen changes or insufficient training data. In addition, the
system dynamics is expected to display rich nonlinear
behavior during the transients. In this work, we propose
an online attack detection algorithm which uses the
Koopman mode decomposition (KMD) to identify the
spatial embedding of anomalous (and natural) modes
in the sensors data. The Koopman operator is a linear,
infinite-dimensional, composition operator that describes
the temporal evolution of a set of observable functions
along the trajectories of a finite-dimensional (nonlinear)
dynamical system [20], [21]. Spectral analysis of the
Koopman operator reveals that single-frequency modes,
henceforth termed as the Koopman modes (KMs), can be
embedded in the spatio-temporal dynamics of the non-
linear systems [22]. The KMs are particularly promising
in power systems applications, by way of extending
the notions of linear modal analysis (e.g. participation
factors) to the nonlinear regime in a computationally
efficient manner in contrast to other methods such as
normal forms [23], [24]. Efficient algorithms exist to
compute KMs, as well as the Koopman operator from
streaming data in power systems [25], [26]. Koopman
modal analysis has found several applications in power
systems, including coherency detection, stability, and
partitioning (see [21] and the references therein for
details). As a novel contribution of this work, we extend
the Koopman modal analysis to the case of real-time
identification (detection and localization) of malicious
data attacks on power system sensors, in presence of
transient fluctuations.
Contributions In this paper, we develop an on-
line attack identification algorithm that performs a
Koopman-based spatio-temporal nonlinear modal anal-
ysis on streaming data from the sensors to detect and lo-
calize malicious activities. Performance of the algorithm
is illustrated on IEEE 68-bus test-case using synthetic
attack data generated using GridSTAGE [27] which is a
simulations-based framework (built upon [28] and [29])
to synthesize adversarial scenarios in a cyber-physical
power grid. The rest of the article is structured as
follows: in Sec. II, we present the attack identification
problem in a closed-loop power systems; Sec. III briefly
recaps the KMD, while the proposed attack identification
algorithm is described in Sec. IV; Sec. V illustrates the
working of the algorithm with numerical simulation
results; before the article is concluded in Sec. VI with
a summary and future plan.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
The power grid is a nonlinear electro-mechanical
dynamical system primarily driven by the complex
interactions of various synchronous generator models,
excitation systems, power system stabilizers, governor
controls, as well as dynamic load modulation [28],
[29]. Since the attack identification algorithm does not
require any knowledge of the system model, it suffices
to consider only a compact abstraction of the system
dynamics in the control-affine form of:
xk+1 = f(xk) + h(xk)uk (1a)
yk = g(xk) (1b)
where xk are the vector-valued internal states (e.g.
voltage angles, voltage magnitudes, and frequencies); yk
are the vector-valued measurements from sensors (e.g.
PMUs); uk are the vector-valued control inputs to the
generators (e.g. governor set-points); f , g and h are
locally Lipschitz vector-valued functions of states repre-
senting the system dynamics, measurements, and control
channels respectively. For notational convenience, we as-
sume that the nominal (target) operating point is shifted
to the origin (i.e. f(0)=0), and that g(0)=0 .
Fig. 2. Block diagram of the closed-loop system under attack.
Attack Model: The adversary is assumed to have
compromised one or more of the PMUs, phasor data
concentrators, network routers and/or communication
links. Note that since IEEE Standard C37.118-2 places
no restriction on the choice of the communication
medium, portions of the PMU communication network
may include the internet which is vulnerable to cyber-
attacks. At each of the compromised nodes in the
communication network, the adversary can manipulate
PMU data which is typically not encrypted. The control
center receives the manipulated measurements data y˜k,
with ak := y˜k − yk being the vector-valued injected
attack signal. The control inputs are computed using a
proportional output-feedback controller with control gain
K, such that the closed-loop system becomes:
xk+1 = fc(xk) + hc(xk) ak (2a)
y˜k = g(xk) + ak (2b)
where hc(xk) := h(xk)K and fc(xk) := f(xk) +
hc(xk) g(xk). Fig. 2 illustrates the closed-loop system
including the control inputs and the attack signals. Note
that we do not place any restriction on the type of
attack, and merely interpret the attack signal (ak) as
any maliciously introduced anomaly between the actual
measurements (yk) and the measurements received at the
control center (y˜k).
Attack Identification: Attack identification algo-
rithms involve construction of vector-valued measure-
ment residuals (rk) as a difference between the mea-
surements received at the control center (y˜k) and the
estimated measurements (ŷk):
rk := y˜k − ŷk . (3)
The measurement residuals are fed into some anomaly
detector, such as cosine similarity test, χ2-test, or
CUSUM test [13]–[17]. However, the estimates of the
measurements are often inaccurate (or, unavailable) dur-
ing power system transients caused by unforeseen and/or
unknown changes in load and generation - potentially
misleading the attack detectors into false positives (nat-
ural events identified as attacks) or false negatives (la-
beling an attack event as benign). While the work in
[15] proposes a method to distinguish between anomalies
due to attacks and modeling errors, its reliance on
physics-based linear system models and determination of
multiple thresholds for statistical tests potentially limits
its application to large-scale power systems displaying
rich nonlinearity.
In this work, we propose a Koopman-based attack
identification algorithm which uses a moving win-
dow of n+1 most recent snapshots of measurements
{y˜k−n, . . . , y˜k−2, y˜k−1, y˜k}, n ≥ 2, to identify in real-time
the sensors under attack.
III. BACKGROUND: KOOPMAN MODE
DECOMPOSITION
Consider the discrete-time closed-loop system (2) un-
der the scenario when there is no attack, i.e. ak=0 ∀k,
(no attack) xk+1 = fc(xk) (4)
The Koopman operator U , [21], [23], is an infinite-
dimensional linear operator that acts on any scalar-valued
function of the state, ψ, and maps it into another scalar-
valued function of the state Uψ defined as follows:
Uψ := ψ ◦ fc . (5)
The linearity of the operator is exemplified by the fact
that for any two scalars α1 and α2 , and any two scalar-
valued functions of state ψ1 and ψ2, we have
U (α1ψ1 + α2ψ2) = α1 (Uψ1) + α2 (Uψ2)
The Koopman operator U admits (infinitely many) Koop-
man eigenfunctions φj (non-zero scalar-valued functions
of state) and Koopman eigenvalues λj ∈ C defined as
follows:
Uφj = λjφj , j = 1, 2, 3, . . . (6)
Note that iterative application of (5) and (6) yields
φj(xk) = Ukφj(x0) = λkjφj(x0) . (7)
The set of all Koopman eigenvalues (λj) forms the
discrete spectrum of the Koopman operator U and, along
with its continuous spectra, define the spectral properties
of U [21].
Koopman Mode Decomposition: The Koopman op-
erator translates the finite-dimensional nonlinear dynam-
ics into an infinite-dimensional linear representation.
In particular, let us consider the measurement function
g = (g1, g2, . . . , gp)
T as a p-dimensional vector-valued
function of observables. If each gi lies within the span of
the Koopman eigenfunctions φj , then the vector-valued
observables g can be expanded as:
g(xk) =
∑∞
j=1
φj(xk)vj =
∑∞
j=1
λkjφj(x0)vj (8)
where vj are p-dimensional vector-valued coefficients of
the expansion, called the Koopman modes (KMs) [21].
The expansion in (8) is referred to as the Koopman
Mode Decomposition (KMD). Moreover, λj encode the
temporal signatures in the dynamics, with associated
spatial signatures encoded in φj(x0)vj . In particular, the
magnitude and phase of the Koopman eigenvalue λj are
called, respectively, the growth rate and the frequency of
the associated KM.
Empirical Computation: There exist efficient al-
gorithms to compute finite-sum approximations of the
KMD (8) based on, for example, the Arnoldi algorithm
[21], [22] and the extended dynamic mode decompo-
sition [23], [30]. While we avoid a description of the
methods here for space constraint, it is sufficient to note
that the algorithms use a sequence of n+1 vector-valued
observations {g(x0), g(x1), . . . , g(xn−1), g(xn)}, n≥ 2,
to obtain KMD as:
g(xk) ≈
∑n
j=1
λ̂kj v̂j (9)
where λ̂j are estimates of the Koopman eigenvalues
(λj) , while v̂j estimate the products of the Koopman
eigenfunctions (φj(x0)) and the KMs (vj). A finite
dimensional approximation of the Koopman operator
K∈Rp×p is given as
K = K1K
+
2 , where (10)
K1=
1
n
n−1∑
k=0
g(xk+1)g(xk)
T and K2=
1
n
n−1∑
k=0
g(xk)g(xk)
T,
and the superscript ‘+’ denotes the pseudo-inverse,
[30]. Notice that the empirical estimate K of
Koopman operator, learnt using {g(x0), . . . , g(xn)}
can be used to predict future observations
{ĝ(xn+1), ĝ(xn+2), ĝ(xn+3), . . . } as
ĝ(xn+m) = K
m g(xn) ∀m = 1, 2, 3, . . . (11)
The empirical computational steps (9)-(11) will be used
to design the attack identification algorithm in Sec. IV.
IV. PROPOSED ATTACK IDENTIFICATION
ALGORITHM
Fig. 3 depicts key steps involved in the proposed on-
line attack identification algorithm combining KMD with
spectral clustering, as explained below. For identifying
an attack at time k, a moving window sequence of
n+ 1 observations are used, which is split into two
sub-sequences: a (longer) learning window L ∈ {k−
n, . . . , k − n˜− 1}, and a (shorter) prediction window
P∈{k−n˜, . . . , k} , for some n˜<n .
Step 1 Prediction: We identify the finite-dimensional
empirical Koopman operator K on the learning window
L from (10) and using the empirical Koopman operator
to predict the observations (ĝ) within the prediction
window P from (11).
Step 2 Koopman Mode Analysis: We compute the
error sequence (g˜) by subtracting the predicted sequence
(ĝ) from the actually observed sequence during the
prediction window P . Next the empirical KMs v̂j are
computed using (9) from the error sequence (g˜).
Step 3 Spectral Clustering The KMs identified
in Step 2 encode the latent spatio-temporal signatures
within the error sequence required to identify the adver-
sarial attack. The intuitive idea is that if there is an attack
during the prediction window P then it should leave
certain anomalous signature within the KMs specific to
the attacked sensor measurements. On the other hand,
if there is a natural event (sudden load or generation
change), that would excite similar modes in the physi-
cally neighboring nodes reflecting as non-anomalous de-
viations within the KMs. This allows differentiating be-
tween adversarial attacks and natural events. To facilitate
the identification of anomalous sensor measurements, we
perform a spatio-temporal normalization on the KMs v̂j .
First, we stack up the absolute values of the KMs into a
p×n˜ matrix:
v̂ := [|v̂1| |v̂2| . . . |v̂n˜|] (12)
Then each column of v̂ is normalized to unity-sum,
which effectively puts equal weight to each KM or,
equivalently, disregards the impact of the associated
Koopman eigenvalues. Next, each row in the resulting
matrix is normalized to unity-sum, which effectively puts
equal weight to each sensor irrespective of whether it is
from a generator or a load. This results in the spatio-
temporally normalized KMs stacked up into v . Each row
in v sums up to unity, and represent a sensor.
Step 1:
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Fig. 3. Step-wise schematic of the proposed online attack identification algorithm.
Algorithm 1 Koopman-Based Online Attack Identifica-
tion
Choose n
Choose n˜ < n
Set k ≥ n
while true do
Set learning window L={k−n, . . . , k−n˜−1}
Set prediction window P={k−n˜, . . . , k}
procedure STEP 1 PREDICTION
Estimate K from (10) using the observation
sequence {g(xl)}l∈L (i.e. the learning window)
Use K to predict, as per (11), the observation
sequence {ĝ(xl)}l∈P (i.e. the prediction window)
end procedure
procedure STEP 2 KOOPMAN MODE ANALYSIS
Compute error sequence g˜(xl)=g(xl)−ĝ(xl)
for every l∈P (i.e. the prediction window)
Compute the empirical KMs from the error
sequence {ĝ(xl)}l∈P using (9)
end procedure
procedure STEP 3 SPECTRAL CLUSTERING
Spatio-temporally normalize KMs
Perform spectral clustering on the normalized
KMs by using the weighted adjacency matrix
end procedure
k ← k + 1
end while
Finally a spectral clustering is performed to identify
the anomalous sensors from the spatio-temporally nor-
malized KMs. Since each row in v, corresponding to a
sensor, can be seen as a probability mass function, we
use the KullbackLeibler divergence between the (sensor)
rows to construct the weighted adjacency matrix which is
then fed to k-means clustering algorithm [31] to identify
the dominant (attacked and non-attacked) clusters in the
normalized KMs.
The key algorithmic steps are summarized in Algo-
rithm 1.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We begin this section by describing the adversarial
data generation framework GridSTAGE, and then present
an adversarial use-case illustrating the application of pro-
posed Koopman-based attack identification algorithm.
GridSTAGE (Spatio-Temporal Adversarial scenario
GEneration) To evaluate the performance of the closed-
loop power system under several attack strategies and
mitigation efforts, we developed GridSTAGE which is
a multivariate spatio-temporal data generation frame-
work for simulation of adversarial scenarios in cyber-
physical systems [27]. There is no existing adversarial
data-generation framework that can incorporate several
attack characteristics and yield adversarial PMU data.
GridSTAGE is available as open source from GitHub.
GridSTAGE models the cyber-physical system of the
power grid, simulates adversarial scenarios in the sys-
tem and generates multi-variate, spatio-temporal network
data. GridSTAGE is developed based on Power System
Toolbox (PST) on which nonlinear time-domain simula-
tions can be generated for standard IEEE bus systems.
Using GridSTAGE, one can create several event scenar-
ios by enabling or disabling any of the following: faults,
AGC control, PSS control, exciter control, load changes,
and different types of cyber-attacks. IEEE bus system
data is used for defining the power system environment.
Sensors in the power system include both PMU and
SCADA, and simulated data are generated for both type
of sensors. Rate of frequency and location of the sensors
can be adjusted as well. Detailed instructions on generat-
ing several scenarios with different attack characteristics,
load characteristics, sensor configuration, control param-
eters can be found in the github repository [27]. The
GridSTAGE framework currently supports simulation of
FDI attacks (such as ramp, step, random, trapezoidal,
multiplicative, replay) and DoS attacks (such as time-
delay, packet-loss, freezing) on PMU data [32]. We use
one of these attacks to demonstrate the proposed attack
identification algorithm, while more extensive analysis
on different types of attacks will be performed in future.
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Fig. 4. Time-series closed-loop simulation (using GridSTAGE) of
an adversarial attack scenario. Bottom two plots show the attacked
PMU measurements of voltage angle and magnitude at the buses 1,
9, 52 and 66 in IEEE 68-bus network. Top plot shows the (delayed)
impact of the attack on the resulting system frequencies. The attack
duration (shown in black dashed lines) are between 39s and 64s, while
a natural load change happens in bus 23 (marked by red square) at
38s.
Identifying Multiplicative Attack on PMUs: In this
subsection, we briefly discuss a multiplicative attack on
the PMU data using the IEEE 68-bus as example. In this
attack scenario, the attacker strategically initiates an FDI
attack soon after there is a load change in the system,
by injecting a signal that grows over time in proportion
to the disturbance being measured at the sensor. The
attacker’s goal is to hide behind the existing transient
disturbances in the network (caused due to load change).
Based on the attack characteristics, this introduces a de-
layed impact on the system measurements and especially
when the attack is over, the system sees a sudden change
in measurements which engages control resources to
counter the disturbance. Ideally, these resources should
not have been engaged. The motivation of this work is
to identify such attacks in their early stage such that
disturbance seen by the system is deemed as attack and
additional resources are not engaged. In Fig. 4, the attack
scenario is illustrated, which is initiated at 39s right after
a natural load change which happens at 38s. Finally
Fig. 5 illustrates a successful application of the online
attack identification algorithm which is able to correctly
identify all the attack locations (buses 1, 9, 52 and 66))
within 1s of the attack initiation, by performing a spectral
clustering on the normalized Koopman mode spreads of
all the sensors (top plot). It is evident that the Koopman
mode spread for the attacked sensors (middle plot) are
distinctively different from those at the other locations
(bottom plot), and hence successfully picked out by the
clustering algorithm.
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Fig. 5. Koopman-based modal analysis followed by spectral clus-
tering separates out the attacked sensors from the non-attacked one,
even during transients. The attack is correctly identified at 40s, within
1s of the attack initiation.
VI. CONCLUSION
This work introduced a novel real-time data-driven
attack detection algorithm based on the Koopman mode
decomposition and spectral clustering. Koopman modes
embed the time-series streaming data (such as from
PMUs) from the power grid network into spatio-temporal
modes. A k-means based spectral clustering on the
spatio-temporally normalized KMs identifies the at-
tacked and non-attacked clusters of sensors. The pro-
posed attack detection algorithm is illustrated on a mul-
tiplicative attack on the PMU measurements representing
the bus voltage angle and magnitudes generated using the
GridSTAGE, a spatio-temporal multivariate adversarial
data generation platform that is developed in the scope
of this work. This induced attack if allowed to propagate
for a few seconds, introduces unintended frequency
changes in the network and engages resources without
the need. However, the proposed algorithm successfully
detects the induced attack within 1 second of attack
initiation in the presence of load changes in the network.
Future scope of this work will explore the application
of the proposed attack detection algorithm on wider
attack scenarios, including various strategic and stealthy
attack types, as well as applicability of the method in
differentiating between naturally caused events such as
faults and component failures.
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